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ABSTRACT
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes
is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings.
In the first part of the paper we focus on the setting in
which agents express additive cardinal utilities over ob-
jects. We present computational hardness results as well
as polynomial-time algorithms for testing Pareto optimal-
ity under different restrictions such as two utility values
or lexicographic utilities. In the second part of the paper
we assume that agents express only their (ordinal) prefer-
ences over single objects, and that their preferences are addi-
tively separable. In this setting, we present characterizations
and polynomial-time algorithms for possible and necessary
Pareto optimality.
General Terms
Economics, Theory and Algorithms
Keywords
Game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), Social
choice theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Reallocation of resources to achieve mutually better out-
comes is a central concern in multi-agent settings. A desir-
able way to achieve ‘better’ outcomes is to obtain a Pareto
improvement in which each agent is at least as happy and at
least one agent is strictly happier [1, 5, 28, 30]. Pareto im-
provements are desirable for two fundamental reasons: they
result in strictly more welfare for any reasonable notion of
welfare (such as utilitarian or leximin). Secondly, they sat-
isfy the minimal requirement of individual rationality in the
sense that no agent is worse off after the trade. If a se-
ries of Pareto improvements results in a Pareto optimal out-
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come, that is even better because there exists no other out-
come which each agent weakly prefers and at least one agent
strictly prefers.
We consider the setting in which agents are initially en-
dowed with objects and they also have additive preferences
for the objects. In the absence of endowments, achieving
a Pareto optimal assignment is easy: simply assign every
object to the agent who values it the most. On the other
hand, in the presence of endowments, finding a Pareto opti-
mal assignment that respects individual rationality is more
challenging. The problem is closely related to the problem
of testing Pareto optimality of the initial assignment. A
certificate of Pareto dominance gives an assignment that re-
spects individual rationality and is a Pareto improvement.
In fact, if testing Pareto optimality is NP-hard, then finding
an individually rational and Pareto optimal assignment is
NP-hard as well. In view of this, we focus on the problem
of testing Pareto optimality. In all cases where we are able
to test it efficiently, we also present algorithms to compute
individually rational and Pareto optimal assignments.
Contributions.
We first relate the problem of computing an individually
rational and Pareto optimal assignment to the more basic
problem of testing Pareto optimality of a given assignment.
We show for unbounded number of agents, testing Pareto
optimality is strongly coNP-complete even if the assignment
assigns at most two objects per agent.
We then identify some natural tractable cases. In partic-
ular, we present a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for the
problem when the number of agents is constant. We char-
acterize Pareto optimality under lexicographic utilities (i.e.,
lexicographic preferences) and we show that Pareto optimal-
ity can be tested in linear time. For dichotomous preferences
in which utilities can take values α or β, we present a char-
acterization of Pareto optimal assignments which also yields
a polynomial-time algorithm to test Pareto optimality.
In the ordinal setting, we consider two versions of Pareto
optimality: possible Pareto optimality and necessary Pareto
optimality. For both properties, we present characteriza-
tions that lead to polynomial-time algorithms for testing the
property for a given assignment.
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Related Work.
The setting in which agents express additive cardinal
utilities and a welfare maximizing or fair assignment is
computed is a very well-studied problem in computer sci-
ence [2, 10, 11, 13, 19, 18, 23, 26, 27, 31, 32]. Although com-
puting a utilitarian welfare maximizing assignment is easy,
the problem of maximizing egalitarian welfare is NP-hard.
Algorithmic aspects of Pareto optimality have received at-
tention in discrete allocation of indivisible goods, random-
ized allocation of indivisible goods, two-sided matching, and
coalition formation under ordinal preferences [1, 5, 8, 21, 28].
Since we are interested in Pareto improvements, our paper
is also related to housing markets with endowments and or-
dinal preferences [4, 22, 25, 33, 34]. Recently, Damamme
et al. [17] examined restricted Pareto optimality under ordi-
nal preferences.
de Keijzer et al. [18] study the complexity of deciding
whether there exists a Pareto optimal and envy-free as-
signment when agents have additive utilities. They also
showed that testing Pareto optimality under additive utili-
ties is coNP-complete. We show that this result holds even
if each agent has two objects.
Cechla´rova´ et al. [16] proved Pareto optimality of an as-
signment under lexicographic utilities can be tested in poly-
nomial time. In this paper, we present a simple characteri-
zation of Pareto optimality under lexicographic utilities that
leads to a linear-time algorithm to test Pareto optimality.
Bouveret et al. [14] consider necessary Pareto optimal-
ity as Pareto optimality for all completions of the respon-
sive set extension,1 and present some computational results
when necessary Pareto optimality is considered in conjunc-
tion with other fairness properties. Reallocating resources
to improve fairness has also been studied before [20].
2. PRELIMINARIES
We consider the setting in which we have N = {1, . . . , n}
a set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , om} a set of objects, and the
preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies for each agent
i her complete, transitive and reflexive preferences %i over
O. Agents may be indifferent among objects. Let ∼i and
i denote the symmetric and anti-symmetric part of %i,
respectively. We denote by E1i , . . . , E
ki
i the ki equivalence
classes of an agent i ∈ N . Those classes partition O into ki
sets of objects such that agent i is indifferent between two
objects belonging to the same class, and she strictly prefers
an object of Eki to an object of E
l
i whenever k < l.
Each agent may additionally express a cardinal utility
function ui consistent with %i: ui(o) > ui(o′) iff o i o′
and ui(o) = ui(o
′) iff o ∼i o′. We will assume that each ob-
ject is positively valued, i.e, ui(o) > 0 for all i ∈ N and
o ∈ O. The set of all utility functions consistent with %i
is denoted by U(%i). We will denote by U(%) the set of all
utility profiles u = (u1, . . . , un) such that ui ∈ U(%i) for
each i ∈ N . When we consider agents’ valuations according
to their cardinal utilities, then we will assume additivity,
that is ui(O
′) =
∑
o∈O′ ui(o) for each i ∈ N and O′ ⊆ O.
An assignment p = (p(1), . . . , p(n)) is a partition of O into
n subsets, where p(i) is the bundle assigned to agent i. We
denote by X the set of all possible assignments.
An assignment p ∈ X is said to be individually ratio-
1Brams et al. [15] used the term Pareto ensuring for Pareto
optimality for all completions of the responsive set extension.
nal for an initial endowment e ∈ X if ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(e(i))
holds for any agent i. An assignment p ∈ X is said to be
Pareto dominated by another q ∈ X if (i) for any agent
i ∈ N , ui(q(i)) ≥ ui(p(i)) holds, (ii) for at least one
agent i ∈ N , ui(q(i)) > ui(p(i)) holds. An assignment is
Pareto optimal iff it is not Pareto dominated by another
assignment. Finally, whenever cardinal utilities are con-
sidered, the social welfare of an assignment p is defined as
SW (p) =
∑
i∈N ui(p(i)).
Example 1. Let n = 3, m = 5, and the utilities of the
agents be represented as follows.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
1 16 8 4 2 1
2 9 3 1 1 3
3 6 1 2 6 2
Since u1(o1) > u1(o2), we can say that o1 1 o2. An
example of an assignment is p = (o2o4|o1|o3o5) in which
p(1) = {o2, o4}, p(2) = {o1}, and p(3) = {o3, o5}.
3. ADDITIVE UTILITIES
In this section we assume that each agent expresses a car-
dinal utility function ui over O, where ui(o) > 0 for all i ∈ N
and o ∈ O.
3.1 Complexity of testing Pareto optimality
We will consider Pareto optimality and individual ratio-
nality with respect to additive utilities. The following lemma
shows that the computation of an individually rational and
Pareto-improving assignment is at least as hard as the prob-
lem of deciding whether a given assignment is Pareto opti-
mal:
Lemma 1. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to
compute a Pareto optimal and individually rational assign-
ment, then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to test
Pareto optimality.
Proof. We assume that there is a polynomial-time algo-
rithmA to compute an individually rational and Pareto opti-
mal assignment. Consider an assignment p for which Pareto
optimality needs to be tested. We can use A to compute
an assignment q which is individually rational for the initial
endowment p and Pareto optimal. By individual rationality
ui(q(i)) ≥ ui(p(i)) for all i ∈ N . If ui(q(i)) = ui(p(i))
for all i ∈ N , then p is Pareto optimal simply because
q is Pareto optimal. However if there exists i ∈ N such
that ui(q(i)) > ui(p(i)), it means that p is not Pareto opti-
mal.
A Pareto optimal assignment can be computed trivially by
giving each object to the agent who values it the most. Bou-
veret and Lang [12] proved that a problem concerning coali-
tional manipulation in sequential allocation is NP-complete
(Proposition 6). The result can be reinterpreted as follows.
Theorem 1. Testing Pareto optimality of a given assign-
ment is weakly coNP-complete for n = 2 and identical pref-
erences.
Corollary 1. Computing an individually rational and
Pareto optimal assignment is weakly NP-hard for n = 2.
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One may additionally require the balanced property, i.e.,
each agent gets as many objects as she initially owned. Both
the theorem above and the corollary above can be extended
to that case easily. If there are an unbounded number of
agents, then testing Pareto optimality of a given assignment
is strongly coNP-complete [18]. Next, we show that the
problem remains strongly coNP-complete even if each agent
receives exactly 2 objects.
Theorem 2. Testing Pareto optimality of a given assign-
ment is strongly coNP-complete for an unbounded number of
agents even if each agent receives exactly 2 objects.
Proof. The reduction is done from 2-numerical
matching with target sums (2NMTS in short). The
inputs of 2NMTS is a sequence a1, . . . , ak of k positive in-
tegers such that
∑k
i=1 ai = k(k + 1) and 1 ≤ ai ≤ 2k − 1
for i = 1, . . . , k, and a1 ≤ a2 . . . ≤ ak. We want to decide if
there are two permutations pi and θ of the integers {1, . . . , k}
such that pi(i)+θ(i) = ai for i = 1, . . . , k. 2NMTS is known
to be strongly NP-complete [35].
The reduction from an instance of 2NMTS is as follows.
There are 3k + 1 agents N = L ∪ C ∪ R ∪ {d} where
L = {`1, . . . , `k}, R = {r1, . . . , rk} and C = {c1, . . . , ck}
and 6k + 2 objects O = F ∪ G ∪ H ∪ {o} where F =
{fLi , fRi : i = 1, . . . , k}, G = {gLi , gRi : i = 1, . . . , k} ∪ {gC},
H = {hCLi , hCRi : i = 1, . . . , k}. Let ε be a positive value
strictly lower than 1/2. The following table summarizes the
non-zero utilities provided by the different objects, where
agt#1 is the agent which receives the object in the initial as-
signment and uagt#1 is her utility for it, and where agt(s)#2
lists the other agents with non-zero utility for the object and
uagt(s)#2 corresponds to their utility for it:
object agt#1 uagt#1 agt(s)#2 uagt(s)#2
hCLi ci ai `i 1 + ε
hCRi ci 3k ri 1− ε
fLi `i 1 cj with aj ≥ i+ 1 i
fRi ri 1 cj with aj ≥ i+ 1 3k + i
gRi ri 3 ri+1 if i < k 3 + ε
d if i = k 3 + ε
gLi `i 3 `i−1 if i > 1 3− ε
r1 if i = 1 3 + ε
gC d 3 `k 3− ε
o d 1
The initial assignment provides the following utilities to the
agents: uci({hCLi , hCRi }) = 3k + ai, u`i({fLi , gLi }) = 4 and
uri({fRi , gRi }) = 4 for i = 1 . . . k, and ud({gC , o}) = 4.
Clearly, this instance is constructed within polynomial
time and each agent has two items in the initial assignment.
We claim that there is a Pareto improvement of the initial
assignment iff {ai : i = 1 . . . k} is a yes-instance of 2NMTS.
Assume that there exist pi and θ such that pi(i)+θ(i) = ai
for i = 1 . . . k, i.e., {ai : i = 1 . . . k} is a yes-instance of
2NMTS. Note that this implies for any i = 1 . . . k that
pi(i) + 1 ≤ ai and θ(i) + 1 ≤ ai (1)
because pi(i) ≥ 1 and θ(i) ≥ 1. Then consider the following
assignment:
fL1 g
L
1
fL2 g
L
2
fLk g
L
k
ℓ1
ℓ2
ℓk
o gCd
gR1 f
R
1
gR2 f
R
2
gRk l
R
k
r1
r2
rk
Figure 1: Initial assignment for agents of L∪R∪{d}.
• {hCLi , gLi+1} (resp. {hCLk , gC}) is assigned to `i with
i < k (resp. to `k) with utility 4.
• {hCRi , gRi−1} (resp. {hCR1 , gL1 }) is assigned to ri with
i > 1 (resp. to r1) with utility 4.
• {fRpi(i), fLθ(i)} is assigned to ci. Using (1), the utility of
agent ci is 3k + pi(i) + θ(i) = 3k + ai.
• {o, gRk } is assigned to d with utility 4 + ε.
This allocation is clearly a Pareto improvement of the initial
allocation.
Assume now that {ai : i = 1 . . . k} is a no-instance
of 2NMTS. By contradiction, assume that there exists a
Pareto improvement p of the initial assignment. Note first
that any agent should receive in p at least two objects. In-
deed there is no object which provides a utility greater than
3 + ε to any agent of L ∪ R ∪ {d}, and any of those agents
receives a utility 4 in the initial assignment. Furthermore,
any good fRi provides a utility at most 3k + i to an agent
cj , which is strictly lower than her utility 3k+ aj in the ini-
tial assignment because aj ≥ i + 1 (otherwise cj would get
utility 0 from fRi ). Since the number of objects is twice the
number of agents, we can conclude that p assigns exactly 2
objects to every agent.
Let us focus first on the objects of G. Those objects are
the only ones which can provide a utility at least 3 − ε to
the agents of L∪R∪{d}. All other objects provide a utility
at most 1 + ε to the agents in L ∪R ∪ {d}. So, to achieve a
utility at least 4 for all those agents in L ∪R ∪ {d}, each of
them should receive exactly one good from G (with non-zero
utility for it) because |L∪R∪{d}| = |G| = 2k+ 1. Figure 1
illustrates the initial assignment for the agents of L∪R∪{d}.
In this figure, a dotted arrow from an object of G means that
this object can be reassigned to the pointed agent with a non
zero utility. Figure 1 illustrates the fact that the goods of
G could be allocated in only two different manners in p to
be a Pareto improvement of the initial endowment: either
every good of G is assigned to the same agent as in the
initial assignment, or every good of G is assigned to the
agent pointed by the corresponding arrow in Figure 1.
First, we consider the case where all goods of G are as-
signed in p exactly as in the initial assignment. To achieve
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a utility at least 4, every agent ri should receive the object
fRi to complete her bundle of two objects. This implies that
those objects cannot be assigned to agent ci, with i = 1 . . . k,
in order to ensure that they get a utility at least 3k + ai.
Therefore every agent ci should receive the object h
CR
i with
utility 3k. Furthermore no agent ci can receive an object f
R
j
to complete her bundle of two objects because this object
would provide her a utility at most ai−1. So, every agent ci
should receive the object hCLi . From this, we conclude that
p should be exactly the same assignment as the initial as-
signment, which contradicts p Pareto-dominates this initial
assignment.
From the previous paragraphs, we know that any good
of G should be assigned in p to the agent pointed by the
corresponding dotted arrow in Figure 1. To achieve a util-
ity at least 4, any agent `i should receive the good h
CL
i to
complete her bundle of two objects. If an agent ci did not
receive at least one good fRj such that ai ≥ j + 1, then the
maximal utility achievable by ci would be 3k+ai−1, which
would be strictly lower than her utility in the initial assign-
ment. So, every agent ci should receive exactly one good f
R
j
such that ai ≥ j+ 1. Therefore no good fRi can be assigned
to agent ri. So, to achieve a utility at least 4, any agent
ri should receive the good h
CR
i to complete her bundle of
two objects. Then the good o should be assigned to agent d
to complete her bundle of two goods. Finally it remains to
assign to every agent ci a good f
L
j such that ai ≥ j + 1.
Now let us focus on the pair of goods assigned in p to
agent ci with i = 1 . . . k. Note that those two objects belong
to F . We know that the total amount of utility provided by
the goods of F to the agents of C should be exactly equal to
3k2 + k(k + 1). Furthermore any agent ci should receive a
share of at least 3k+ai of this total amount of utility. Since∑k
i=1(3k+ ai) = 3k
2 + k(k+ 1), any agent ci should receive
two objects fLj and f
R
j′ such that uci({fLj , fRj′ }) = 3k + ai.
Let pi and θ be the two permutations of {1, . . . , k} such that
for any i = 1 . . . k, the objects fLpi(i) and f
R
θ(i) are assigned in
p to agent ci. Those two permutations are such that for any
i = 1 . . . k, pi(i) + θ(i) = ai. This leads to a contradiction
with {ai : i = 1 . . . k} is a no-instance.
Note that Theorem 2 is the best possible NP-hardness
result that we can obtain according to the number of objects
received by each agent because if initially each agent has
exactly one object in assignment p, then our problem can
be solved in linear-time.
3.2 Complexity of testing Pareto optimality:
tractable cases
We now identify conditions under which the problem of
computing individually rational and Pareto optimal assign-
ments is polynomial-time solvable.
3.2.1 Constant number of agents and small weights
Lemma 2. If there is a constant number of agents, then
the set of all vectors of utilities that correspond to a feasible
assignment can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm (by 0k we de-
note 0, . . . , 0 with k occurrences of 0).
Let W be the maximal social welfare that is achievable;
then, at any step of the algorithm, the number of vectors
in L cannot exceed (W + 1)n. Hence the algorithm runs
1: L← {(0n)};
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: L′ ← {l + (0i−1, ui(oj), 0n−i) | i ∈ N ; l ∈ L}
4: L← L′
5: end for
6: return L
in O(Wn · n · m). Now, W ≤ ∑i,j ui(oj), and since n is
constant, the algorithms runs in pseudopolynomial time.
We can prove by induction on k that a vector of utili-
ties l = (v1, . . . , vn) can be achieved by assigning objects
o1, . . . , ok to the agents if and only if l belongs to L after ob-
jects o1, . . . , ok have been considered. This is obviously true
at the start of the algorithm, when no object at all has been
considered. Now, suppose the induction assumption is true
for k. If l belongs to L after iteration k, then l′ belongs to L
after iteration k+1 iff l′ is obtained from l by adding ui(ok)
to the utility of some agent i, that is, if l = (v1, . . . , vn) can
be achieved by assigning objects o1, . . . , ok+1.
Theorem 3. If there is a constant number of agents, then
there exists a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm to compute
a Pareto optimal and individually rational assignment.
Proof. We apply the algorithm of Lemma 2, but in ad-
dition we keep track, for each l ∈ L, of a partial assignment
that supports it: every time we add l + (0i−1, ui(oj), 0n−i)
to L′, the corresponding partial assignment is obtained from
the partial assignment corresponding to l, and then mapping
oj to i. If several partial assignments correspond to the same
utility vector, we keep an arbitrary one. At the end, we ob-
tain the list L of all feasible utility vectors, together with,
for each of them, one corresponding assignment. For each of
them, check whether there is at least one l′ in L that Pareto
dominates it, which takes at most O(|L|2), and we recall that
L is polynomially large. The assignments that correspond
to the remaining vectors are Pareto optimal.2
3.2.2 Lexicographic Utilities
We say that utilities are lexicographic if for each agent
i ∈ N , ui(o) >∑o′≺io ui(o′). By q(i) %i p(i), we will mean
ui(q(i)) ≥ ui(p(i)).
In order to test the Pareto optimality of an assignment
p, we construct a directed graph G(p) = (V (p), E(p)). The
set of vertices V (p) contains one vertex per object belonging
to O. Furthermore, for any vertex of V (p) associated to an
object o, the set of edges E(p) contains one edge (o, o′) for
any object o′ belonging to O \{o} such that o′ %i o, where i
is the agent who receives the good o in p. For example, Fig-
ure 2 illustrates such graph for the assignment p provided by
Example 2. In Figure 2, dotted edges represent indifferences
(when o′ ∼ o) and plain edges represent strict preferences
(when o′  o). It follows from [16] that Pareto optimality
of an assignment under lexicographic utilities can be tested
in polynomial time. We provide a simple characterization of
a Pareto optimal assignment under lexicographic utilities.
The characterization we present also provides an interest-
ing connection with the possible Pareto optimality that we
consider in the next section.
2Note that it is generally not the case that we get all Pareto
optimal assignments: if there are several assignments corre-
sponding to the same utility vector, then we’ll obtain only
one.
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o1
o2 o5
o3 o4
Figure 2: Graph G(p) for assignment p in Example 2.
Theorem 4. An assignment p is not Pareto optimal wrt
lexicographic utilities iff there exists a cycle in G(p) which
contains at least one edge corresponding to a strict prefer-
ence.
Proof. Assume that there exists a cycle C which con-
tains at least one edge corresponding to a strict preference.
Then, the exchange of objects along the cycle by agents
owning the objects corresponds to a Pareto improvement.
Assume now that p is not Pareto optimal and let q1 be
an assignment which Pareto dominates p. For at least one
agent i, q1(i) i p(i). So there exist at least one object o1 in
q1(i) \ p(i). Let i1 be the owner of o1 in p. Since preferences
are lexicographic, in compensation of the loss of o1, agent
i1 must receive an object o2 in q1 which is at least as good
as o1 according to her own preferences. Let i2 be the owner
of o2 in p and so on. Since O is finite, there must exist
k and k′ such that the sequence ok → ok+1 → . . . → ok′
forms a cycle, i.e., ok = ok′ . If 6 ∃l ∈ [k, k′ − 1] such that
ol+1 il ol then we consider the assignment q2 derived from
q1 by reassigning any object ol+1, with l ∈ [k, k′ − 1], to
agent il. It is obvious that this assignment q2 is at least
as good as q1 for all the agents. So q2 Pareto dominates
p. By following the same reasoning as above, we can state
that there exists a sequence of objects ok → ok+1 → . . . →
ok′ such that ok = ok′ and for any l ∈ [k, k′ − 1], ol+1
is assigned to agent il in q2 to compensate the loss of ol
assigned to him in p (obviously with ol+1 %il ol). Once
again if 6 ∃l ∈ [k, k′−1] such that ol+1 il ol then we consider
the assignment q3 derived from q2 by reassigning any object
ol+1, with l ∈ [k, k′ − 1], to agent il. . . Since for any s > 1
we have
∑
i∈N |qs−1(i) ∩ p(i)| <
∑
i∈N |qs(i) ∩ p(i)|, there
must exist a finite value t such that ∃l ∈ [k, k′−1] such that
ol+1 il ol for the cycle ok → ok+1 → . . . → ok′ founded
in qt. Indeed otherwise after a finite number of steps t we
should have qt(i) = p(i) for all i ∈ N , which leads to a
contradiction with qt Pareto dominates p. So there exists
a cycle ok → . . . → ok′ in G(p) with at least one edge
corresponding to a strict preference.
It is clear that the graph G(p) can be constructed in linear
time for any assignment p. Furthermore, the search of a
cycle containing at least one strict preference edge in G(p)
can be computed in linear time by applying a graph traversal
algorithm for any strict preference edge in G(p). Therefore
testing if a given assignment is Pareto optimal can be done
in linear time when utilities are lexicographic.
Example 2. Let n = 3, m = 5, and the following ordinal
information about preferences corresponding to the lexico-
graphic utilities in Example 1 (as a consequence of Theo-
rem 4, ordinal preferences are enough information to check
Pareto optimality).
1 : o1  o2  o3  o4  o5
2 : o1  o2 ∼ o5  o3 ∼ o4
3 : o1 ∼ o4  o3 ∼ o5  o2
Let p = (o2o4|o1|o3o5) be the initial assignment. The con-
struction of Theorem 4 gives us that it is Pareto dominated
by (o2o3|o1|o4o5), hence it is not Pareto optimal.
3.2.3 Two utility values
In this section we assume the agents use at most two util-
ity values for the objects. We say that the collection of
utility functions (u1, . . . , un) is bivalued if there exist two
numbers α > β > 0 such that for every agent i and every
object o, ui(o) ∈ {α, β}. (The result would still hold if each
agent i has a different pair of values (αi, βi), provided that
αi
βi
=
αj
βj
for all i, j.) This means that for every agent i, the
set of objects O is partitioned into two subsets E1i = {o ∈
O, ui(o) = α} and E2i = {o ∈ O, ui(o) = β} (with possibly
E2i = ∅). Given an assignment q, let q+(i) = q(i) ∩ E1i , and
q−(i) = q(i) ∩ E2i .
We provide a first requirement for an assignment to Pareto
dominate another one:
Lemma 3. If an assignment p is Pareto dominated by an
assignment q then |⋃i∈N q+(i)| > |⋃i∈N p+(i)|.
Proof. For contradiction we assume that
|⋃i∈N q+(i)| ≤ |⋃i∈N p+(i)|. In that case
SW (q) = |⋃i∈N q+(i)|α + |⋃i∈N q−(i)|β =
|⋃i∈N q+(i)|(α−β) + |O|β ≤ |⋃i∈N p+(i)|(α−β) + |O|β =
α|⋃i∈N p+(i)|+β|⋃i∈N p−(i)|. So SW (p) ≥ SW (q), which
contradicts the assumption that q Pareto dominates p.
Lemma 4. If an assignment p is not Pareto optimal then
there exists an assignment q such that (i) ∀i ∈ N, |q+(i)| ≥
|p+(i)| and (ii) ∃j ∈ N, |q+(j)| > |p+(j)| and p−(j) 6= ∅.
Proof. Assume that p is not Pareto optimal. Then there
exists an assignment q∗ which Pareto dominates p. We claim
that we can reassign the objects in q∗ in order to obtain an
assignment q such that (i) and (ii) hold.
For any agent i we initialize q(i) to q+∗ (i). In order to ob-
tain (i), while there exists i ∈ N such that |q+(i)| < |p+(i)|,
we choose o ∈ p+(i) \ q+(i) and we assign o to agent i in q.
Note that o may belong to another agent in q but neverthe-
less the total number of object assigned in q never decreases.
Furthermore, after at most |⋃i∈N p+(i)| steps, condition (i)
will hold because an object
⋃
i∈N p
+(i) can be reassigned at
most once. Finally, Lemma 3 implies that |⋃i∈N q+∗ (i)| >
|⋃i∈N p+(i)| and |⋃i∈N q(i)| ≥ |⋃i∈N q+∗ (i)|. Therefore
|⋃i∈N q(i)| > |⋃i∈N p+(i)|.
Let A = {i ∈ N | p−(i) 6= ∅} and B = {i ∈ N | |q(i)| >
|p+(i)|}. Note first that A 6= ∅ because otherwise p would
be Pareto optimal. If A ∩ B 6= ∅ then condition (ii) holds.
Otherwise, if ∃i ∈ A and o ∈ O\⋃j∈N q(j) such that o ∈ E1i
then assign o to i in q and condition (ii) holds. Otherwise
if ∃i ∈ A, ∃j ∈ B and ∃o ∈ q(j) such that o ∈ E1i then
reassign object o to i in q and condition (ii) holds (note that
(i) remains true).
Finally we show that other cases never occur. Indeed
otherwise we would have A ∩ B = ∅ and ∀i ∈ A, ∀o ∈
O\⋃j∈N q(j), o ∈ E2i and ∀i ∈ A, ∀j ∈ B,∀o ∈ q(j), o ∈ E2i .
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This would mean that |⋃i∈AE1i | = |⋃i∈A p(i)∩E1i |. There-
fore we would have |⋃i∈A q∗(i)∩E1i | ≤ |⋃i∈A p(i)∩E1i |. But
q∗ Pareto dominates p implies ∀i ∈ A, ui(q∗(i)) ≥ ui(p(i)).
Therefore
∑
i∈A |q∗(i)∩E1i |α+ |q∗(i)∩E2i |β ≥
∑
i∈A |p(i)∩
E1i |α+ |p(i)∩E2i |β which implies |q∗(i)∩E2i | ≥ |p(i)∩E2i |.
We can now bound the social welfare of q∗ by
∑
i∈A |q∗(i)∩
E1i |α+
∑
i∈A |q∗(i)∩E2i |β + |O \
⋃
i∈A q∗(i)|α =
∑
i∈A(β −
α)|q∗(i) ∩ E2i | + |O|α ≤
∑
i∈A(β − α)|p(i) ∩ E2i | + |O|α =∑
i∈A |p(i)∩E2i |β+ |O \ (
⋃
i∈A p(i)∩E2i )|α =
∑
i∈N ui(p(i))
which is a contradiction with q∗ Pareto dominates p.
Based on the lemma, we obtain the following characteri-
zation of Pareto optimality in the bivalued case.
Theorem 5. An assignment p is Pareto dominated iff
there exists an assignment q such that (i) ∀i ∈ N, |q+(i)| ≥
|p+(i)| and (ii) ∃j ∈ N, |q+(j)| > |p+(j)| and p−(j) 6= ∅.
Proof. One implication has already been proved in
Lemma 4. To prove the second implication we assume first
that there exists q such that (i) and (ii) holds. Let j be as
described as in (ii). For any i ∈ N\{j}, let Ai ⊆ q+(i)
such that |Ai| = |p+(i)|. Let Aj ⊆ q+(j) such that
|Aj | = |p+(j)|+1. Let A¯ = O\⋃i∈N Ai. Note that by defini-
tion |A¯| = |⋃i∈N p−(i)|−1 because |A¯| = |O|−|⋃i∈N Ai| =∑
i∈N |p(i)| −
∑
i∈N |p+(i)| − 1 =
∑
i∈N |p−(i)| − 1.
We partition A¯ into n subsets A¯1, . . . A¯n such that ∀i ∈
N \ {j}, |A¯i| = |p−(i)| and |A¯j | = |p−(j)| − 1. Finally, let q′
be the assignment such that ∀i ∈ N, q′(i) = Ai ∪ A¯i. It is
clear that ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, ui(q′(i)) ≥ |Ai|α+ |A¯i|β = ui(p(i))
and uj(q
′(j)) ≥ |Aj |α + |A¯j |β > uj(p(j)). So p is Pareto
dominated by q′.
Theorem 6. Under bivalued utilities, there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm for checking Pareto optimality
and finding a Pareto improvement, if any.
Proof. According to Theorem 5, a Pareto improvement
can be computed by focusing on the assignment of top ob-
jects for the agents. We describe an algorithm based on
maximum flow problems to obtain such assignment. For
any i ∈ N , let Gi = (Vi, Ei) be a directed graph which mod-
els the search of a Pareto improvement for agent i as a flow
problem. The set of vertices Vi contains one vertex per agent
and per object, plus a source s and a sink t. To ease the
notation, we do not discriminate between the vertices and
the agents or objects that they are representing, therefore,
we note Vi = N ∪ O ∪ {s, t}.The set of edges Ei and their
capacities are constructed as follow:
• For any l ∈ N and o ∈ O such that o ∈ E1l there is an
edge (l, o) with capacity 1.
• For any o ∈ O there is an edge (o, t) with capacity 1.
• For any l ∈ N \ {i} there is an edge (s, l) with ca-
pacity |p+(l)|, and there is an edge (s, i) with capacity
|p+(i)|+ 1.
It is easy to show that there exists a flow of value∑
l∈N |p+(l)| + 1 iff there exists an assignment such that
any agent l ∈ N \ {i} receives at least |p(l) ∩ E1l | top ob-
jects and agent i receives |p+(l)| + 1 top objects. So by
Theorem 5, there exists a Pareto improvement of p iff there
exists i ∈ N such that p(i)∩E2i 6= ∅ and there exists a flow of
value
∑
l∈N |p+(l)|+1 in Gi. Therefore finding a Pareto im-
provement can be performed in polynomial time by solving
at most n maximum-flow problems. In each Pareto improve-
ment the number of top objects increases by at least one so
there can be at most m Pareto improvements.
Note that we can also find a Pareto optimal Pareto im-
provement in polynomial time as well: in each Pareto im-
provement the number of top objects increases by at least
one so there can be at most m Pareto improvements.
Example 3. Let n = 3, m = 6, E11 = {o1, o2, o3}, E12 =
{o2}, E13 = {o1, o3, o5, o6}, and p = (o1o4|o2o5|o3o6). G1 is
depicted in Figure 3. The flow of value 5 (boldface) gives the
assignment (o1o3|o2o4|o5o6), which Pareto-dominates p.
s
1
2
3
o1
o2
o3
o4
o5
o6
t
2
1
2
Figure 3: Flow network G1 in Example 3.
4. ORDINAL PREFERENCES
In this section, we consider the setting in which the agents
have additive cardinal utilities but only their ordinal pref-
erences over the objects is known by the central authority.
This could be because the elicitation protocol did not ask
the agents to communicate their utilities, or simply because
they don’t know them precisely. In this case, one can still
reason whether a given assignment is Pareto optimal with
respect to some or all cardinal utilities consistent with the
ordinal preferences. An assignment p is possibly Pareto op-
timal with respect to % if there exists u ∈ U(%) such that p
is Pareto optimal for u. An assignment is necessarily Pareto
optimal with respect to % if for any u ∈ U(%) the assignment
p is Pareto optimal for u.
4.1 Possible Pareto Optimality
We first note that necessary Pareto optimality implies pos-
sible Pareto optimality. Secondly, at least one necessarily
Pareto optimal assignment exists in which all the objects
are given to one agent. We focus on the problems of testing
possible and necessary Pareto optimality.
In order to characterize possible Pareto optimality, we
first define stochastic dominance (SD) which extends ordinal
preferences over objects to preferences over sets of objects
(and even over fractional allocations in which agents can get
fractions of items). We say that an allocation q(i) stochasti-
cally dominates an allocation p(i), denoted by q(i) %SDi p(i),
iff |q(i)∩⋃kj=1Eji | ≥ |p(i)∩⋃kj=1Eji | for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ki}.
In the case of fractional allocations, q(i) ∩⋃kj=1Eji denotes
the units of items give to i for items in
⋃k
j=1E
j
i .
The SD relation is equivalent to the responsive set exten-
sion [9], which also extends preferences over objects to pref-
erences over sets of objects. Formally, for agent i ∈ N , her
preferences %i over O are extended to her preferences %RSi
over 2O as follows: q(i) %RSi p(i) iff there exists an injection
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f from p(i) to q(i) such that for each o ∈ p(i), f(o) %i o.
Since %RSi is a partial order, we say a preference Ri is a
completion of %RSi if it is a complete and transitive relation
over sets of objects that is consistent with %RSi . We say that
an assignment is SD-efficient if it is Pareto optimal with re-
spect to the SD relation of the agents, and RS-efficient if
it is Pareto optimal with respect to the RS set extension
relation of the agents. Under ordinal preferences, an agent
i prefers one allocation q(i) over another p(i) with respect
to responsive set extension iff she prefers it with respect to
stochastic dominance [14, 7]. Thus, a (discrete) assignment
is RS-efficient iff it is SD-efficient. We say that q strictly
RS-dominates p if q Pareto dominates p with respect to RS.
Theorem 7. An assignment is possibly Pareto optimal
iff it is SD-efficient iff it is RS-efficient iff there exists no
cycle in G(p) which contains at least one edge corresponding
to a strict preference.
Proof. By the ordinal welfare theorem, a fractional as-
signment is possibly Pareto optimal iff it is SD-efficient
(among the set of fractional assignments) [3, 6, 29]. Fur-
thermore, a discrete assignment p that is SD-efficient among
all discrete assignments is also SD-efficient among all frac-
tional assignments because SD-efficiency of p depends on the
non-existence of a cycle with a strict edge in the underlying
graph G(p) [3, 24]. Hence, we obtain the equivalences.
Since the characterization in Theorem 4 also applies to
RS-efficiency and possible Pareto optimality, hence possible
Pareto optimality can be tested in linear time. The argu-
ment in the proof above also showed that possible Pareto
optimality is equivalent to Pareto optimality under lexico-
graphic preferences.
We point out that a possibly Pareto optimal assignment
may not be a necessarily Pareto optimal assignment.
Example 4. Consider two agents with identical prefer-
ences o1  o2  o3  o4. Every assignment is possibly
Pareto optimal; however the assignment p in which agent
1 gets {o1, o4} and 2 gets {o2, o3} is not necessarily Pareto
optimal since it is not Pareto optimal for the following util-
ities.
o1 o2 o3 o4
1 10 9 8 7
2 10 3 2 1
4.2 Necessary Pareto Optimality
Next we present two characterizations of necessary Pareto
optimality. The first highlights that necessary Pareto opti-
mality is identical to the necessary Pareto optimality con-
sidered by Bouveret et al. [14].
Theorem 8. An assignment is necessarily Pareto opti-
mal iff it is Pareto optimal under all completions of the re-
sponsive set extension.
Proof. If an assignment is not Pareto optimal under cer-
tain additive preferences, it is by definition not Pareto op-
timal under this particular completion of responsive prefer-
ences.
Assume that an assignment p is not Pareto optimal under
some completion of the responsive set extension. Then there
exists another assignment q in which for all i ∈ N q(i) %RSi
p(i) or p(i) RSi q(i) and q(i) RSi p(i), and for some i ∈ N ,
q(i) RSi p(i) or p(i) RSi q(i) and q(i) RSi p(i). For both
the cases, if the allocations are incomparable with respect to
responsive set extension, then there exists an object o such
that |q(i)∩{o′ : o %i o}| > |p(i)∩{o′ : o %i o}|. In that case,
consider a utility function ui in which ui(o
′′′) − ui(o′′) ≤ 
for all o′′′, o′′ %i o and ui(o) >
∑
o′≺io ui(o
′) + |O|. For ui,
ui(q(i)) > ui(p(i)).
For characterizing necessarily Pareto optimal assign-
ments, we define a one-for-two Pareto improvement swap as
an exchange between two agents ij and ik involving objects
o1j , o
2
j ∈ p(ij) and ok ∈ p(ik) such that ok ij o1j %ij o2j .
Theorem 9. An assignment p is necessarily Pareto op-
timal iff (i) it is possibly Pareto optimal and (ii) it does not
admit a one-for-two Pareto improvement swap.
Proof. We first show that if an assignment does not sat-
isfy the two conditions, then it is not necessarily Pareto op-
timal. Possible Pareto optimality is a requirement for the
assignment to be necessarily Pareto optimal. To see that
the second condition is also necessary, we have to show that
if p admits a one-for-two Pareto improvement swap then
p is not necessarily Pareto optimal. This is because the
swap could indeed be a Pareto improvement for these two
agents with the following utilities: uij (ok) > 2uij (o
1
j )(≥
uij (o
1
j ) + uij (o
2
j )) and uik (ok) < uik (o
1
j ) + uik (o
2
j ). These
utilities are compatible with the ordinal preferences of these
agents, because of the assumption ok ij o1j %ij o2j (and
irrespective to the ordinal preferences of ik).
Conversely, to show that conditions (i) and (ii) are suf-
ficient for the assignment to be necessarily Pareto opti-
mal, suppose for a contradiction that (1) p is not necessar-
ily Pareto optimal and (2) p does not admit a one-for-two
Pareto improvement swap. We will then show that there is
an assignment that strictly RS-dominates p, implying that
p cannot be possibly Pareto optimal.
From (1) and Theorem 8, we have (3) there is another
assignment q and a collection of additive utility functions
u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U(%) such that q Pareto dominates p
with respect to u.
Without loss of generality
we may assume that each agent receives a nonempty bun-
dle in p. Regarding the structure of p, first we observe
that the lack of one-for-two Pareto improvement swaps im-
plies that every agent is assigned to some (or none) of her
top objects and possibly to one additional object that she
ranks lower. Formally, let Tp(i) denote a set of i’s top objects
she is assigned to in p, i.e., Tp(i) = {o : o ∈ p(i) s.t. @o′ /∈
p(i), o′ i o}. Then p(i) = Tp(i) ∪ wp(i), where wp(i) is
either a single object or the empty set.
We show that |q(i)| = |p(i)| must hold for every agent
i. Suppose not, then there is an agent i for which |q(i)| <
|p(i)|. By the definition of Tp(i) it is straightforward that
if wp(i) = ∅ then ui(p(i)) = ui(Tp(i)) > ui(q(i)), and if
wp(i) 6= ∅ then ui(p(i)) = ui(Tp(i) ∪ wp(i)) > ui(Tp(i)) ≥
ui(q(i)), a contradiction. Furthermore, for every agent i, if
wp(i) 6= ∅ then for any object o ∈ q(i) we have o %i wp(i).
Otherwise, if there was an agent i with o ∈ q(i) such that
wp(i) i o, then ui(Tp(i)) ≥ ui(q(i) \ {o}) would imply
ui(p(i)) = ui(Tp(i) ∪ wp(i)) > ui(q(i)).
Now we construct a so-called Pareto improvement se-
quence with respect to p and q, which consists of a sequence
of agents {i1, i2, . . . ik} with possible repetitions and a set of
distinct objects {o1, o2, . . . , om} such that
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• o1 ∈ q(i2) \ p(i2), o2 ∈ p(i2) \ q(i2), and o1 %i2 o2;
• o2 ∈ q(i3) \ p(i3), o3 ∈ p(i3) \ q(i3), and o2 %i3 o3;
• . . .
• om ∈ q(i1) \ p(i1), o1 ∈ p(i1) \ q(i1), and om %i1 o1.
and with strict preference for at least one agent.
The presence of the above Pareto improvement sequence
would imply the existence of an assignment q′ that RS-
dominates p, obtained by letting the agents exchange their
objects along the sequence, i.e., with q′(i) = p(i) ∪ {ok−1 :
ik = i, k = 1, . . . ,m} \ {ok : ik = i, k = 1, . . . ,m}. This
would contradict our assumption that p is possibly Pareto
optimal.
We first define three types of agents, and a one-to-one
mapping pi over some of the objects they are indifferent
between in p and q. In the set X we put all the agents with
either no wp(i) or with wp(i) ∈ q(i). Each agent i in this set
must be indifferent between all objects in (p(i)\q(i))∪(q(i)\
p(i)) (i.e., these object are in a single tie in i’s preference
list) by the following reasons. |p(i)| = |q(i)| implies |p(i) \
q(i)| = |q(i) \ p(i)|. By the definition of Tp(i) it follows that
any object in p(i) \ q(i) is weakly preferred to any object
in q(i) \ p(i) by i. However, from (3) we have ui(q(i)) ≥
ui(p(i)), which implies that ui(q(i) \ p(i)) ≥ ui(p(i) \ q(i)),
which can only happen if i is indifferent between any two
objects in (p(i)\q(i))∪ (q(i)\p(i)). Let pi be any one-to-one
mapping from q(i) \ p(i) to p(i) \ q(i).
Next, let Y contain every agent i who has object wp(i)
such that there is an object o ∈ q(i)\p(i) with o ∼i wp(i). In
this case i must be indifferent between all objects in (Tp(i)\
(q(i) \ {o})) ∪ ((q(i) \ {o}) \ Tp(i)).
Indeed, |p(i)| = |q(i)| implies |Tp(i)\(q(i)\{o})| = |(q(i)\
{o}) \ Tp(i)|.
By the definition of Tp(i) any object in Tp(i)\(q(i)\{o}) is
weakly preferred to any object in (q(i)\{o})\Tp(i) by i. On
the other hand, ui(q(i)) ≥ ui(p(i)) and o ∼i wp(i) implies
ui((q(i) \ {o}) \ Tp(i)) ≥ ui(Tp(i) \ (q(i) \ {o})), leading to
the conclusion that i must be indifferent between all objects
in (Tp(i)\(q(i)\{o}))∪((q(i)\{o})\Tp(i)). Therefore pi can
map o to wp(i) in pi and (q(i)\{o})\Tp(i) to Tp(i)\q(i)\{o}).
Thirdly, let Z contain every agent i with object wp(i)
such that for every o ∈ q(i), o i wp(i). Note that there
is at least one agent in Z, the one who gets strictly better
off in q, as otherwise, if there was an object o ∈ q(i) such
that wp(i) %i o, then ui(Tp(i)) ≥ ui(q(i) \ {o}) would imply
ui(p(i)) = ui(Tp(i) ∪ wp(i)) ≥ ui(q(i)).
Finally, we shall note that if Tp(i) is empty then |p(i)| =
|q(i)| = 1, so either i is indifferent between p(i) = wp(i) and
q(i), in which case i is in Y with pi(q(i)) = p(i), or i strictly
prefers q(i) to p(i) and then i belongs to Z.
To summarize, so far we have that for any i ∈ X ∪ Y and
o ∈ q(i) \ p(i) we associate an object pi(o) ∈ p(i) \ q(i) such
that o ∼i pi(o). Furthermore, for any i ∈ Z and o ∈ q(i)\p(i)
we have that o i wp(i).
We build a Pareto improvement sequence as a part of a
sequence involving agents i1, i2, . . . with corresponding ob-
jects o1, o2, . . . starting from any i1 ∈ Z with o1 = wp(i).
For every k ≥ 2, let ik be the agent who receives ok−1 in
q. If ik ∈ X ∪ Y then let ok = pi(ok−1), and if ik ∈ Z then
let ok = wp(i). We terminate the sequence when an object
is first repeated. This repetition must occur at some agent
in Z, since for any agent i the objects in q(i) \ p(i) are in a
one-to-one correspondence with those in p(i) \ q(i) with pi.
Let the first repeated object belong to, say, is = it ∈ Z
for indices 1 ≤ s < t. We show that the sequence is, . . . it−1
is a Pareto improvement sequence. To see this, let us
first consider an agent i ∈ X ∪ Y . Whenever i appears
in the sequence as ik ∈ {is+1, . . . it} she receives object
ok−1 ∈ q(i) \ p(i) and in return she gives away pi(ok−1) =
ok ∈ p(i) \ q(i), where i is indifferent between ok−1 and ok.
Now, let i ∈ Z \ {it} that appears as il ∈ {is+1, . . . it}. She
receives object ol−1 ∈ q(i) \ p(i) and in return she gives
away wp(i) = ok ∈ p(i) \ q(i), where ol−1 i wp(i) by the
definition of Z. Since i appears in this sequence only once,
it is obvious that ui(q
′(i)) > ui(p(i)). Finally, regarding
i = is = it ∈ Z, i receives ot−1 ∈ q(i) \ p(i) and she gives
away wp(i) = os ∈ p(i) \ q(i), where ot−1 i wp(i). So we
constructed a Pareto improvement sequence, and therefore
p is not possibly Pareto optimal, a contradiction.
In Example 4, p is not necessarily Pareto optimal be-
cause it admits a one-for-two Pareto improvement swap: o2,
o3 ∈ p(2), o1 ∈ p(1) and o1 2 o2 %2 o3. It also shows that
although an assignment may not be necessarily Pareto opti-
mal there may not be any assignment that Pareto dominates
it for all utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences.
The characterization above also gives us a polynomial-time
algorithm to test necessary Pareto optimality.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied, from a computational point of view,
Pareto optimality in resource allocation under additive util-
ities and ordinal preferences. Many of our positive algorith-
mic results come with characterizations of Pareto optimality
that improve our understanding of the concept and may be
of independent interest. Future work includes identifying
other important subdomains in which Pareto optimal and
individually rational reallocation can be done in a computa-
tionally efficient manner.
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